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BUDGET DEFICITS, TAX INCENTIVES AND INFLATION:
A SURPRISING LESSON FROM THE 1983-84 RECOVERY
ABSTRACT
The first two years of the economic expansion that began in
1983 were unusually strong and were accompanied by better
inflation performance than would have been expected on the basis
of experience in past recoveries.
Our evidence contradicts the popular view that the recovery
was the result of a consumer boom financed by reductions in the
personal income tax. We also find no support for the proposition
that the recovery reflected an increase in the supply of labor
induced by the reduction in personal marginal tax rates.
The driving force behind the recovery of nominal demand was
the shift to an expansionary monetary policy. The rapid
expansion of nominal GNP can be explained by monetary policy
without any reference to changes in fiscal and tax policy.
But the growth of real GNP was more rapid than would have
been expected on the basis of the rise in total nominal spending
and the increase in the price level was correspondingly less. The
most likely cause of this favorable division of the nominal CNP
increase was the sharp rise in the dollar that occurred at this
time.
Although part of the dollar's rise can be attributed to the
successful anti-inflationary monetary policy, the dollar also
increased because of the rise in real interest rates that
resulted from the combination of the increase in anticipated
budget deficits and the improved tax incentives for investment in
equipment and structures.
Thus, expansionary fiscal policy did contribute to the
greater-than-expected rise of real CNP in 1983-84 but it did so
through an unusual channel. The fiscal expansion raised output
because it caused a favorable supply shock to prices and not
because it was a traditional stimulus to demand.The budget
deficit and investment incentives were expansionary in the short
run because, by causing a rise of the dollar, they reduced
inflation and thus permitted a faster growth of real CNP.
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In November 1982 the unemployment rate reached 10.6 percent, the
trough of the worst recession of the postwar period. During the next 24
months, the unemployment rate fell by 3.5 percentage points and real CNP
expanded by 11.9 percent. This stronger than normal expansion was -
accompaniedby a declining rate of inflation; the annualized rates of
increase of the CNP deflator fell from 3.6 percent in the fourth quarter of
1982 to 3.0 percent in the fourth quarter of 1984.
Thesaying that failure is an orphan while success has many self-
proclaimed fathers can be applied to business cycles in general and to this
one in particular. The battle over paternity is joined here by supply
siders, by Keynesian fiscalists, and by monetarists.
-
Somesupply side economists argue that the recovery reflected the
favorable incentive effects on individual work effort of the January 1983
reductions in personal tax rates. In the extreme version of this view,
workers reduced their labor supply when the prospective tax cuts were
legislated in 1981, preferring to consume more of their lifetime leisure
when aftertax wages were relatively low, and then to increase their work
effort after the tax rate reductions raised net wages.
*MartinFeldstein is Professor of Economics at Harvard University and
President of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Douglas Elmendorf
is a graduate student at Harvard University. This paper was prepared for
the NBER Conference on Tax Policy and the Economy, Washington, D.C.,
November 15, 1988. We are grateful to Creg Mankiw and Lawrence Summers for
helpful comments.The "Keynesian fiscalists" regard the 1983-84 expansion as a
traditional demand-determined recovery driven by increased defense spending
and by the rise in consumer demand that resulted from the personal tax
reductions. We use the term "Keynesian fiscalists" to emphasize that these
economists disregard the role of monetary policy in the expansion.
Finally, monetarists point to the sharp reversal of the Federal
Reserve's policy in the summer of 1982, some six months before the business
cycle trough. With inflation falling rapidly, the rate of change of the
real money stock increased even more rapidly than the rate of change of the
nominal money stock. The Fed cut the discount rate sharply throughout the
summer and fall, and short term market rates dropped dramatically.
In an earlier report on this research, Feldstein (1986a) argued that
none of these claims provides an adequate explanation of the more rapid
than normal recovery in real GNP and suggested an alternative analysis of
how the changes in monetary policy, budget deficits and tax incentives for
investment acted together to produce the unusually strong recovery. The
present paper elaborates on that previous discussion and presents evidence
in support of that alternative view.
Before turning to the evidence, it is useful to summarize the
explanation that the evidence suggests:
(a) The iücreaaed employment and output did not reflect an increase
in the deaire to work, but was the result of an increased demand for labor
that permitted unemployed job-seekers to return to work. While the
unemployment rate fell from 10.6 percent to 8.3 percent in the first year
2of the expansion, labor force participation rates showed virtually no
2
movement.
(b) The sharp change in monetary policy was the driving force in the
expansion of nominal demand; the rapid expansion of nominal GNP can be
explained by the shift in monetary policy without any reference to the
changes in fiscal and tax policy. The composition of the CNP change also
suggests the dominant importance of monetary policy.
(c) However, the growth of real GNP was more rapid than would be
expected on the basis of the rise in total nominal spending and the
increase in the price level was correspondingly less. The most likely cause
of this favorable division of the nominal GNP increase was the sharp rise
in the dollar that occurred at this time.
(d) Although part of the dollar's rise can be attributed to the
successful anti-inflationary monetary policy, the dollar also increased
because of the rise in real interest rates that resulted from the
combination of increased budget deficits and the improved tax incentives
for investment in equipment and structures. The changes in fiscal and tax
policy thus contributed to the unusually strong reel GNP growth by causing
inflation to be less than it otherwise would have been. Stated differently,
with monetary policy given, the fiscal expansion temporarily reduced
inflation and thereby contributed to temporarily stronger real CNP growth.
2 The labor forceparticipation rate for women 20 years and older
increased only from 52.9 percent in November 1982, the trough of the
recession, to 53.2 percent in November 1983, one year into the expansion.
The corresponding rate for men actually fell from 78.8 percent to
78.4 percent during the same period. And the labor force participation
rate for all people aged 16 to 19 fell also from 54.5 percent to
53.3 percent.
3(e) The tax incentives for business fixed investment also affecred
the composition of the recovery in real CNP. Despite the rise in real
interest rates, the recovery was characterized by a much greater than
normal increase in business investment while the increase in consumer
spending was similar to the increase in previous recoveries.
Section 1 of the paper presents the evidence that the rise in noeinal
GNP can be explained by the shift in monetary policy. Detailed evidence on
the relative strength of different sectors, presented in Section 2,
supports the importance of the change in monetary policy and interest rates
and implies that neither increased government spending nor personal tax
cuts was a significant factor in the demand recovery. The third section
shows that real CNP grew faster than might have been anticipated on the
basis of past experience but that this discrepancy can be explained by the
favorable effect of the rising dollar on the overall level of domestic
prices. There is a brief concluding section.
We are, of course, aware that the evidence that we present msy be
subject to different interpretstions. We hope that our analysis will
encourage others to provide additional tests of our proposed explanation of
the recovery of 1983-84 and of the implied theory of the interaction of
monetary, tax, and fiscal policies.
1. The Rise in Nominal ON?
The path of nominal GNP changed dramatically at the end of 1982. After
rising at a rate of only 3.0 percent from the fourth quarter of 1981
through the fourth quarter of 1982, nominal ON? then rose 9.8 percent in
1983 and 8.2 percent in 1984. The seasonally adjusted quarterly rates of
4change of nominal CNP are presented for 1982:1 through 1984:4 in Row 1 of
Tahle 1.
The simplest explanation of this increase is the change of monetary
conditions during the preceding year. The rate of increase of the real
money stock (i.e. ,thedifference between the rate of increase of 142 and
the rate of increase of the GNP deflator) rose from 2.2 percent in the
first half of 1982 to 5.0 percent during the second half of the year.3
Real short-term interest rates dropped dramatically; the 3-month Treasury
bill rate plummeted from over 12 percent in June 1982 to 8 percent within
three months. The Federal Reserve reduced the discount rate in parallel
with very little delay, cutting it from 12 percent in June to 10 percent in
September and then 8.5 percent by the end of the year.
To assess the proposition that the 1983-84 expansion of nominal demand
can be explained without reference to fiscal changes, we present two types
of evidence. The first, presented in Table 1, shows the forecast errors in
predictions of nominal GNP in 1983-84 based on distributed lags of money
alone and of money and alternative fiscal variables. The second, presented
in Table 2, shows formal F-tests of the significance of the fiscal
variables in the explanation of changes in nominal CNP in both a long
sample and in the recent quarters.
1.1 An Analysis of Forecast Residuals
The forecast residuals associated with an equation relating nominal
GNP growth to past changes in the money stock (nominal M2) shows that the
The rate of growth of Ml increased from 4.6 percent in the first
half of 1982 to nearly 12 percent in the second half of 1982. The rate of
growth of 142 rose from 7.8 percent to 9.6 percent.
5increases in nominal GNP in 1982, 1983 and 1984 are fully predicted without
any reference to the shifta in fiscal policy. More specifically, we
estimated the relation between the quarterly change in the logarithm of
nominal GNP and three lagged values of the change in the logarithm of M2.4
The equation was estimated by ordinary least squares for the period from
the first quarter of 1960 through the business cycle peak in the third
quarter of 1981. The equation was then used to predict the rates of growth
of nominal GNP in the out-of-sample period beginning with the fourth
quarter of 1981.
Row 2 of Table 1 presents the forecast residuals, i.e., the difference
between the actual quarterly GNP growth rates and the rates predicted on
the baaia of the lagged changes in money. For comparison, the table
includes the forecast errors for 1982, the last four quarters of the
recession. The standard error of each of these quarterly forecasts is
approximately 0.01, i.e., one percentage point of nominal CNP.
The striking thing about the errors in the out-of-sample forecasts for
the recovery period is that they are generally negative, indicating that
the actual rise in nominal GNP was less than the rise predicted by the
historic relation between nominal 01W and money. During the first two
years of the recovery, the forecast error was negative 5 times; however,
only two of the forecast errors (one positive and one negative) exceeded
the standard error. The cumulative forecast error for the first four
quarters of the recovery was negative and 1.7 percent of GNP, slightly less
than the four-quarter forecast standard error of 2.0 percent of CNP. The
All of the data used in this paper were drawn from the DRI database,
updated for data revisions through September 1988.
6forecast error for the first eight quarters was also negative and, at
1.4 percent of GNP, less than the associated standard error of 2.9 percent
of GNP. There is no "surprisingly strong" rise in total nominal CNP that
needs to be explained by the budget deficit or by tax law changes.5
We would, of course, be the first to acknowledge that an equation
linking nominal GNP growth to money growth alone is an extremely simplified
model. But we regard its predictions and the associated forecast residuals
as useful benchmarks and reject as unnecessarily nihilistic the view of
those economists like Friedmsn (1988) who believe that the velocity
fluctuations of the 1980s mean that nothing can be learned from quantity
relationships like those considered here. First, we are studying growth
rates and not relations in levels, so a one-time shift in velocity of the
type that occurred in 1982 would not affect the residuals for 1983 or 1984
from our equations. Second, if velocity fell sharply in 1982 because of
suddenly expansionary monetary policy (acting through a sharp fall in
interest rates, as Poole (1988) has suggested, then our emphasis on the
importance of monetary policy to the recovery is not misplaced. Morenver,
the increase in nominal GNP from 1982 to 1983 predicted by our equations
represents part of the increase in actual growth of nominal GNP between
those years.
It might be argued that the residuals in 1983, although negative,
are smaller absolutely than the residuals of 1982, suggesting that
"something" had made nominal GNP grow more rapidly in 1983 than would have
been predicted on the basis of lagged money alone. There is no way to test
this view that the unobserved and unobservable shock that caused velocity
to drop in 1982 persisted into 1983 and was offset by fiscal policy. We
take the more conventional view that 1982 was the abnormal year in which
velocity declined and that there was nopriori reason to expect the
negative disturbance to persist into 1983. More formally, we believe that
the residuals for 1983 and 1984 should be tested against the null
hypothesis of zero and not against the values for 1982.
7Adding measures of fiscal policy to the basic equation does not
improve the explanation of the rapid growth of nominal CNP in 1983 and
1984. On the contrary, since fiscal policy was "expansionary" at this
time, the forecaats that include fiscal variables overpredict CNP gm-tb by
an even grearer margin, thereby increasing the absolute size of the
forecast residuals. The basic fiscal variables in our expanded equstion
are the ratios of cyclicslly-sdjusted tax revenue and government outlsys to
cyclically-adjusted ON?, each represented by three lagged values. Since
the difference between these measures of receipts and outlays is equal to
the cyclically-adjusted deficit as a fraction of ON? in each quarter, the
coefficient values could make this equivalent to a distributed lag of
deficit-ON? tatios.
Row 3 of Table 1 reports the forecast residuals based on an equation
in which fiscal variables are added to the distributed lag of M2 growth
rates. The cumulative forecast error is 3.6 percent of ON? for the first
four quarters of the recovery snd 7.3 percent of ON? for the first eight
quarters. The point to be stressed is that the monetary variables more
correctly explain the rism in nominal ON? without reference to the fiscal
variables.
We are, of course, aware of the ususl arguments that equations of this
type understate the importance of fiscal policy (e.g., Blinder and Solow,
1974). In the current context, a stronger fiscal effect would by itself
cause an even greater overprediction of ON? growth. While not suggesting
that the estimated coefficients are appropriate estimates of true reduced
form parameters, we emphasize that they imply no support for a role for
fiscal policy in explaining the nominal ON? expansion in 1983-84.
8The results represented by these two equations are not sensitive to
the measurement of monetary and fiscal policies. As part of our
sensitivity analysis we redefined the government outlay variable to exclude
the component of government interest outlays that just compensate
bondholders for the inflation-erosion of the debt.6 The result, shown in
row 4, is similar to the basic estimates of row 3.
We also tested the sensitivity of the results to the change in bank
regulations that shifted the demand for money in 1983. The changes in
regulations that took effect at the start of 1983, including the
introduction of national NOW accounts and changes in the interest rate
ceilings, caused an increase in the demand for Ml and M2 balances. The Fed
accommodated this increase, permitting M2 to rise at a 16.1 percent annual
rate. A mechanical interpretation of the relation between nominal GNP and
the increase in the money stock may overstate the expansionary effect of
monetary policy.7 We have therefore re-estimated the analysis of equations
corresponding to Rows 2 through 4 with an adjusted money stock constructed
to eliminate the effect of the deregulation-induced shift in the demand for
money balances. More specifically, the growth rates of M2 in 1983:1 and
1983:2 are reduced to smooth the path of M2 from 1982:4 to 1983:3 by
6 Weconstruct an inflation-adjusted outlay measure by subtracting the
product of the quarterly change in the CNP deflator and the stock of
outstanding government debt at the beginning of the quarter from the
traditional measure of outlays.
7Federal Reserve Cha,.rman Volcker and the Federal Open Market
Committee emphasized in testimony and official statements on several
occasions that the Ml growth rates from 1982:4 through 1983:2 and the M2
growth rates in 1983:1 and 1983:2 were really adjustments to the new
regulatory environment and therefore not directly comparable to past
increases in the money stock. See also Economic Report of the President,
1984, Chapter 1.
9replacing the actual growth rates during the two transition quarters by the
average of the prior and subsequent quarter growth rates. The effect is to
leave the level of M2 3.5 percent lower beginning in 1983:3.
The results for this adjusted M2 variable are shown in Rows 5 through
7. The forecast residuals for the basic equation with no fiscal variable
(Row 5) are rapresentative of the effect of using the adjusted money stock.
The equation no longer systematically overpredicts the growth of nominal
CNP. Three of the forecast residuals are positive, three are negative and
two are zero; only one is larger than the standard error. The cumulative
forecast error for four quarters and eight quarters are 0.008 and 0.009,
both substantially smaller than the corresponding standard errors.
Including the fiscal variables with the adjusted money stock once again
raises the forecast growth of nominal GNP and by approximately the same
amounts as in the equations represented by Rows 3 and 4. These equations
again overpredict CNP growth but by less than the equations using the raw
money values. In short, the adjusted money stock variable provides better
point estimates, but the choice between adjusted and unadjusted money stock
variables does not alter the conclusion that the rise of nominal GNP in
1983-84 can be explained without reference to the changes in tax receipts
and outlays.
We have also examined the residuals based on equations using Ml and
adjusted Ml instead of M2 and adjusted M2. The results were qualitatively
similar although not identical. In general, the underprediction of nominal
CNP growth was worse in the Ml equations than in the M2 equations. The
addition of the fiscal variables (inflation-adjusted or not) magnified the
negative residuals.
10The analysis has also been repeated with the sample restricted to
begin in 1968:1 instead of 1960:1. We did this because some authors
(e.g. ,Friedman,1986 and 1988) have stressed that the relation between the
monetary aggregates and nominal GNP may have changed in the mid-l960s.
We find that the results based on the shorter sample are essentially the
same as those based on the full sample.
1.2 The Incremental Explanatory Power of Fiscal Variables
The conclusion that the expansion of nominal GNP in the 1983-84
recovery can be explained without reference to fiscal policy is consistent
with a long line of monetarist thinking and of econometric evidence in the
St. Louis equation framework of Andersen and Jordan (1968). Both the
theory and the empirical research remain controversial and are likely to
Continue to do so in the future.
Although Blinder and Solow (1974) and others have argued that the
Coefficient estimates and statistical tests of the impact of fiscal policy
in the Andersen-Jordan framework are biased, McCallum (1986) has recently
provided a strong defense of these procedures. We will not enter into the
debate about whether the tests of the efficacy of fiscal policy based on
this framework are correct or not. But for those who want to see the
evidence for the most recent recovery within this framework, we provide
formal tests of the relevance of the fiscal variables as determinants of
the growth of nominal GNP are presented in Table 2. The tests are based on
estimating the nominal GNP growth equations for the entire period from
1960:1 through 1985:4 and testing whether the addition of the fiscal
11variables reduces the sum of squared residuals.8 We allow for a change in
the constant term and in the coefficients on the distributed lag on money
after 1981:3. We test separately for the effect of the fiscal variables in
the early sample (through 1981:3) and the late sample (from 1981:4 to
1985:4); in Table 2, Test 1 refers to the effect of the fiscal variables
during the early sample while Test 2 refers to the effect of the fiscal
variable during the late period only.9 Separate tests are presented for
adjusted and unadjusted money stocks and with and without the inflation
adjustment to the fiscal variables.
Consider first the test based on the unadjusted definitions of the
money and fiscal variables. Test 1, for the early sample period, has an
F-statistic of 1.30 (shown on the first line of Table 2) which corresponds
to a statistically insignificant probability level of 0.25. Test 2, for
the later sample, has an F-statistic of 2.16, which because of the more
limited number of observations, also corresponds to a statistically
insignificant probsbility level.
The second line of Table 2 presents results when the government outlay
variable is adjusted to eliminate the effect of debt erosion. When the
8
Regressing the absolute value of the estimated residuals on a dummy
variable for the period 1981:4 through 1985:4 (as suggested by Pindyck and
Rubinfeld, 1981, p. 152) reveals significant heceroskedasticity.
Therefore, we weight the observations using the mean absolute value of the
estimated residuals in the early and late samples and reestimate the
equstion.
There are only sixteen observations in this later period, so there
are few degrees of freedom in the estimation and the five percent critical
values for the F-statistics shown below will be fairly high. Although
these exclusion tests therefore have low power, the F-statistics are
generally so small that even a powerful test would be very unlikely to
reject the null hypotheses. See Fisher (1970, p. 365) for a discussion of
testing similar hypotheses with insufficient degrees of freedom.
12adjusted M2 money stock is used (lines 3 and 4 of Table 2), the fiscal
variables are even less significant statistically in the late sample.1°
Similar tests have been done (but are not shown) with adjusted and
unadjusted Ml and with the period truncated to exclude the years before
1968. The results are quite similar to those presented here, with the
probability levels even higher in the Ml equations. This reinforces the
basic result of this analysis that fiscal variables contribute to the
explanation of nominal GNP in the l980s only (if at all) when no adjustment
is made for the effects of inflation on the fiscal variables.
It is important to note that all of the results of this section apply
to nominal GM? and do not consider the possible importance of fiscal policy
to real GNP gjyj3 the level of nominal GM?. In Section 3, we examine the
impact of recent fiscal policy on the division of nominal GM' growth into
real GM? growth and inflation. First, however, we provide further evidence
of the importance of monetary policy in the 1983-84 recovery.
2. The Composition of Real GMP Growth in the Recovery
The conclusion that the recovery of nominal GNP can be attributed to
the increase in money growth and the fall in interest rates is also
supported by an analysis of the relative rates of increase of the major
components of r!al GNP during the first two years of the recovery. Table 3
compares the growth rates of these real GNP components with the average
10 Theearly sample tests are identical to those for the unadjusted
money variables because the adjustment (described above) only affects
quarters after 1981:3.
13growth rates for each of these components during the five previous postwar
11
recoveries -
Considerfirst the relative growth rates of total real CNP. The first
column in the upper portion of Table 3 (labeled Current) shows the
seasonally adjusted quarterly growth rate of real CNP in each qusrter from
1983:1 (denoted Ql) through 1984:4 (denoted Q8). The corresponding growth
rate for the four quarters ending in 1983:4 is denoted Tl and the annual
average growth rate for the eight quarters ending in 1984:4 is denoted
Yl-2. The average of the real GNP growth rates in the corresponding
quarters12 of previous recoveries is shown in the second column (labelled
Avg. for Average), and the estimated standard error of that mean is shown
in the third column.
These data show that real GNP rose 0.9 percent between the final
quarter of 1982 and the first quarter of 1983, just about half of the
average first-quarter growth rate of 1.7 percent during the previous five
recoveries. With a standard error of 0.3, it can be said that the first
quarter rise of the current recovery was significantly slower than the
average of the past increases. Although this difference is reversed in the
second and fourth quarters, for the year as a whole the rate of growth of
11 Theseare the recoveries that began in 1954:3, 1958:3, 1961:2,
1971:1, and 1975:2. The analysis excludes the recovery that began in
1950:1 (which was unusual due to the Korean War) and the most recent 1980-1
recovery which was so short-lived that the next downturn occurred within
two years of the start of the expansion. The real components of CNP are
directly from the National Income and Product Accounts, with the exception
of Federal government military spending, which is converted to real values
using the overall Federal government spending deflator because the military
deflator is not available for the whole postwar period.
12 Thequarters are aligned so that Ql always corresponds to the first
quarter after the trough of the recession, Q2 to the second quarter after
the trough, etc.
14real GNP at 6.5 percent was only slightly greater than the 6.0 percent
average real GNP increase in the first four quarters of previous
expansions; with a standard error of 0.8 percentage points, this difference
is not statistically significant. The start of the second year of the
current recovery was, however, much stronger than the average of the
corresponding quarters of previous recoveries. As a result the rate of
increase of real GNP for the eight quarters as a whole was substantially
greater than the average of previous recoveries: an average annual rate of
5.8 percent in compariaon to the previous average of 4.8 percent with a
standard error of 0.2 percentage points.
It might be argued that real GNP grew especially fast in the recovery
because it had fallen especially far during the recession. Without
entering into the current macroeconomic debate about the time series
properties of real GNP, we note simply that there is no evidence for a
correlation between the depth of a recession and the pace of the initial
recovery; the GNP growth rates for the first four quarters of each postwar
recovery (as well as for the first eight quarters) display no correlation
with the depth of the receasion as measured by the decline in real ON?
between the previous cyclical peak and the trough.
When we examine the major components of real GNP we find that the most
striking difference between the 1983-84 recovery and previous recoveries
was in the strength of investment. By the second quarter of the recovery,
the percentage increase in investment was approximately twice as great as
the average of previous recoveries. For the first four quarters,
investment roae 41.2 percent in comparison to the 22.6 percent average in
previous recoveries, an increase four times the standard error of
154.6 percentage peints. For the two years as a whole, the average anneal
rate of increase of investment was 26.] percent versus the 12.7 percent
-13
two-year average in previous recoveries.
In contrast to the relatively powerful response of investment, the
expansion of consumption was no stronger in this recovery than in pre'Thua
recoveries. The figures in Table 3 show that the annual rate of increase
of consumption in the four quarters of 1983 was 5.4 percent, almost exactly
equal to the average rise in the first four quarters of previous
recoveries. For the eight quarters through 1984:4 the annual rate of
increase was 4.8 percent, slightly less than the 4.9 percent average in
previous recoveries, but the difference is not as large as its standard
error.'4 Table 3 shows that this normal cyclical expansion of consumption
in the 1983-84 recovery characterized both durable and nondurable
consumption.
The rate of increase in the federal government component of final
demand was also not greater in the first year of the recovery than it had
been at the same stage in previous recoveries. Real federal government
purchases of goods and services15 actually fell by 8.1 percent. a
13
Although the rapid rise of investment in the recovery might be
thought to be attributable to particularly weak investment performance
during the recession, investment in past recoveries was uncorrelated with
investment during the preceding recessions.
14
Consumption relative to CNP was in fact stronger during the first
year of the recovery than in previous recoveries. There is no evidence
that the tax cut was offset by an equal rise in household saving, but only
that the pace of increase in consumption was not unusually strong in this
recovery while the increase in investment was unusually rapid.
15 Note that thismeasure of government spending as a CNP component is
very different from total government outlays which include transfers as
well as purchases of goods and services.
16substantially larger decline that the 2.3 percent decline in the first four
quarters of previous recoveries.
The initial decline and fairly standard two-year rise in real
government purchases occurred despite a stronger than normal increase in
military spending. Table 3 shows that military spending rose by
5.2 percent in 1983 but actually fell by an average of 4.5 percent in the
first year of previous recoveries. For the two years as a whole, the
5.3 percent annual rise in military spending is significantly larger than
the previous average of -3.3 percent. But although military spending is a
large part of total federal government purchases of goods and services, the
reductions in other purchases kept the overall contribution of increase in
government spending relatively small.
The relatively sharp rise in investment and the relatively modest
increases in consumption and in government spending support the conclusion
of the previous section that the 1983-84 recovery was primarily due to an
easing of monetary policy and not to budget policy. The relatively weak
rise in consumption shows that the 1983-84 recovery was not driven
particularly by personal tax cuts while the relatively slow rise in
government demand shows it was also not driven particularly by government
purchases of goods and services. Of course, all three major components of
GNP contributed to the overall expansion of output but the unusual feature
of the 1983-84 recovery was the much larger than usual rise in investment
while consumption and government spending increases were close to their
historic values. Moreover, the absolute rise in real investment during the
first two years of the expansion (1982:4 to 1984:4) was greater than the
combined increase of consumption and government outlays. In 1982 dollars,
17personal consumption expenditures rose $202 billion, federal governaen:
purchases of goods and services rose $33 billion and investment rose $247
billion. Even fixed investment alone rose $146 billion.
Monetary policy was certainly not the only factor influencing
investment outlays. The major investment incentives enacted in the 1911
tax legislation also contributed to the strength of business investment.
The maximum potential resi net return on investment in plant and equipsnt
rose from 5.8 percent in the late 1970s to 7.5 percent in 1983, the hitnest
level in more than 20 years.16 The special safe-harbor leasing provisions
were a particularly strong stimulus to equipment investment until they were
repealed.
Investment in producers' durable equipment wss far stronger in this
recovery than in previous ones. The growth in the first year was
20.9 percent, more than twice the average of 8.1 percent in previous
recoveries. For the two years, spending on producers' durable equipment
rose at 17.8 percent, again more than twice the 8.8 percent average in paat
recoveries.
Investment in nonresidential structures actually declined sharply
during the first two quarters of the expansion, pulling down the average
for 1983 and for 1983-4. But after the first two quarters, investment in
nonresidential -structures grew nore rapidly in each quarter than the
average of past recoveries.
16 See Feldatein andJun (1987). The maximum potential real net
return is the maximum return that firms can pay on an investment. Ita
variations are reflections of changes in tax rules and in the interaction
of tax rules and inflation.
18Residential fixed investment was particularly strong at the starr of
the recovery and was significantly atronger than usual for both the one-
year and two-year periods. About 62 percent of housing starts were for
single-family units, a fraction that remained constant during the first two
years of the expansion.
The clear implication of all of this analysis is that the rate of
expanaion was relatively greatest in the components of GNP that are most
sensitive to interest rates and to business investment tax incentives.
In comparison to past recoveries, the expansion of 1983-84 can be
characterized as led by investment rather than by either consumption or
government spending. There is no evidence in the composition of spending
to suggest that the very large personal tax cuts caused either consumption
or total GNP to rise by more than their usual rate of increase during the
early stage of a recovery.
3. The Division of Nominal Growth into Inflation end Real Growth
Although the 1983-84 rise in nominal CNP can be explained without
reference to the fiscal deficits, our interest in the more rapid than usual
expansion of j GNP requires us to look beyond monetary policy.The
evidence in the current section shows that the division of nominal GNP
growth was more favorable than would be expected on the basis of past
experience. More specifically, we estimated the regression of the current
rate of change of real GNP on the current rate of change of nominal GNP, on
four lagged values of the rate of change of nominal GNP and on four lagged
values of the rate of change of real CNP. Because of the identity that
changes in nominal GNP equal the sum of changes in real CNP and in the GNP
19implicit price deflator, tins specification is equivalent to one including
lagged inflation rates instead of lagged real growth rates. The equation
reflects the fact that the decomposition of changes in nominal ON? into
changes n real ON? and inflation may depend on the history of inflation
and therefore on expected future inflation. Extensions of this
specification are discussed below.
We estimated this equation for the period from 1968:117 through the
business cycle peak in 1981:3 and then used the parameter estimates to
forecast real CNP changes during the recovery period. We found that the
actual rates of increase of real GNP during the recovery period exceeded
the predicted value in every quarter. It follows therefore that the
observed inflation (measured by the change in the implicit ON? price
deflator) was lower by an equal amount in every quarter than would be
expected on the basis of the past responses to changes in nominal ON?.18
The specific results are shown in Table 4. The first three columns
show the quarterly changes in nominal ON?, real ON? and the implicit price
deflator. All figures are seasonally adjusted and expressed at quarterly
rates. Column 5 presents the predicted quarterly changes in real ON? based
on the equation described above and column 6 presents the differences
between the actual real ON? changes and the predicted changes.
17 Theexchange rate series used below is only available (with the
necessary lags) after 1967.
18 Our evidence isnot directly relevant to the controversy about
whether the 1982 recession and 1983-4 recovery fit the traditional
historical relationship between reductions in inflation and increases in
unemployment, since we focus on the recovery period (not the recession) and
study real output growth (not unemployment).
20The traditional relation between the changes in real GNP and the
distributed lags of nominal GNP and inflation substantially underpredicts
the strength of the real CNP increase in the 1983-84 recovery. The
prediction error is positive in every quarter. For 1983, the equation
predicts 3.4 percent real GNP growth while the actual real 01W growth was
6.4 percent. The cumulative prediction error for the four quarters of 1983
was thus 3.0 percentage points, twice the standard error for this
prediction of 1.5 percentage points. For 1984 the actual real GNP growth
exceeded the predicted amount by an even greater 3.6 percentage points
(with a prediction standard error of 2.6 percentage points). Because of the
identity linking nominal CNP, real GNP and the implicit price deflator it
follows that the observed inflation rates were 3.0 percentage points and
3.6 percentage points lower than the predicted values for 1983 and 1984.
One possible explanation of this favorable division between inflation
and real GNP is that the Federal Reserve's demonstrated commitment to
reducing inflation caused a change in expectations that in turn led to
smaller price increases than would otherwise have been expected. There is
no doubt that the Federal Reserve had permitted the most serious recession
of the postwar period, had emphasized its commitment to controlling the
monetary aggregates along an anti-inflationary path, and had permitted
interest rates to reach unprecedented levels. It is difficult, however, to
assess how much all of this actually changed market expectations and the
extent to which that change in expectations caused smaller increases in
product prices and wages.
One reason to be skeptical about the role of changed perceptions of
monetary policy is that, despite the Fed's rhetoric about slowing the
21growth of the monetary aggregates, Ml and M2 actually continued to increase
quite rapidly. Based on the monetary statistics available at the start of
1983, the increase in M2 actually accelerated from 8.2 percent in 1978 and
1979 to 9.0 percent in 1980, 10.1 percent in 1981 and 9.7 percent in 1982.
A year later the Federal Reserve revised the 1982 M2 growth down to
9.2 percent but reported the 1983 M2 growth to be 11.5 percent. Although
the Fed emphasized that the rapid money growth reflected regulatory
changes, many financial market participants were quite skeptical. That
skepticism extended also to those who watched interest rates rather than
monetary aggregates and saw a sharp decline in interest rates that they
feared had been engineered by the Federal Reserve. The prospect of large
budget deficits also added to this concern that the recently achieved
reduction of inflation might soon be reversed.
The best direct measure of the change in the inflation expectations of
informed and influential market participants is probably the survey
conducted by Richard Hoey, the chief economist at Drexel Burnham Lambert
(Hoey, 1988). Hoey regularly surveys the 10-year inflation expectations of
a group of several hundred senior financial executives and business
economists. He found that the average 10-year inflation expettation fell
along with the decline in actual inflation from a high of 8.8 percent in
October 1980 to 6.8 percent in April 1982 but that it then remained
essentially unchanged during the next two years, varying between 6.3 and
6.8 and ending at 6.8 percent in March 1984.
Unfortunately, since Hoey's survey only began in 1978, it is not
possible to compare the behavior of price expectations during the 1983-84
recovery with price expectations during the previous postwar recoveries. It
22is possible that the stability of inflation expectations during the first
two years -of the recent recovery is unusual and that the stability of
expectations contributed to the more modest increases in prices during this
period. But even if both parts -of that statement are true, it is not cleat
whether the stability of inflation expectations during the recovery period
was due to faith in the Voicker-Reagan policies or simply to the fact that
the observed inflation was itself so moderate during this period.
-
Moreover,the expected one-year inflation rates reported by Hoey were
higher than the prevailing inflation rate during the entire recovery.
We believe that the most important reason for the unusually good price
performance during this period was the sharp rise in the value of the
dollar)9 The Federal Reserve Board's multilateral trade-weighted index of
the dollar's nominal exchange value rose from 105.4 in the fourth quarter
of 1981 to 122.2 in the fourth quarter of 1982, 130.2 in the fourth quarter
of 1983 and 147.2 in the fourth quarter of 1984.
This forty percent increase in the dollar's exchange value directly
lowered the cost of imports and put deflationary pressure on the prices of
U.S. products that compete with imports. The sharp rise in the nominal
value of the dollar was accompanied by a 33 percent increase in the
corresponding real value of the dollar. This increase in the dollar's real
19 Other usualsuspects for changes in domestic inflation are the
behavior of agricultural and energy prices. The producer price index for
crude "foodstuffs and feedstuffs" was quite stable during this period,
equalling 257 in 1981, 248 in 1982, 252 in 1983, and 260 in 1984. Although
sharp shifts in energy prices have been important at other times during
this decade, they too were relatively stable during this initial recovery
period. The producer price index for crude energy prices stood at 783 in
1981, 802 in 1982, 791 in 1983 and 785 in 1984. The strong dollar no doubt
also contributed to this energy stability since the rising dollar
automatically increased the cost in marks and yen and other currencies of
oil and other imported energy products.
23value reduced the demand for U.S. exports and increased the U.S. demand for
imports, thereby inducing stronger domestic price competition and smaller
wage increases than would otherwise have occurred.2°
To assess the impact of the dollar's rise on the division of nominal
CNP growth between real CNP growth and inflation, we expanded the basic
equation to include the current and four lagged values of the multilateral
trade-weighted nominal exchange rate. Column 4 of Table 4 displays the
exchange rate values for 1983:1 to 1985:4. Column 7 of Table 4 shows the
resulting predicted values of the real CNP changes and column 8 the
corresponding prediction errors.
The rising dollar explains the unusual strength of real CNP and the
unusually favorable inflation experience during the expansion. More
specifically, including the distributed lag of exchange rate changes
reduces the 1983 real CNP prediction error from 3.0 percent to 1.9 percent.
For 1984 the prediction error is reduced from 3.6 percent to only 0.3
percent (relative to a standard error of 1.2 percent) and for 1985 it falls
from 4.1 percent to -0.1 percent.
Some part of the dollar's strength was no doubt due to the shift in
monetary policy and the fall in inflation expectations that accompanied the
recession and the observed price decline. The tight monetary policy in
1981 temporarily raised expected real long-term interest rates and thereby
made dollar securities more attractive. The I-they surveys show that the
expected real pretax yield on 10-year government bonds rose from a low of
only 1.6 percent in June/July 1980 to a high of 8.3 percent in September
20 On the effect of the dollar'sstrength on U.S. inflation during
this period, see Sachs (1985).
241981. But by late 1982 the expected real interest rate was down to about4
percentand it stayed at that level through mid-1983. The easing of
monetary policy in the second half of 1982 reduced nominal interest rates
and thereby accelerated the decline in real interest rates. Although post-
1982 monetary policy may have continued to contribute to a strong dollar by
reducing the uncertainty of future inflation, we believe that the pricrary
reason for the dollar's continued rise was the change in U.S. fiscal
policy.
The budget deficit climbed from 2.6 percent of GNP in 1981 to
4.1 percent of CNP in 1982, 6.3 percent of GNP in 1983 and then stabilized
at 5-plus percent of GNP for the next three years. Although there remains
much academic controversy about the link between budget deficits and
interest rates, we believe that the concurrent and especially the expected
future budget deficits raised real interest rates and increased the
attractiveness of dollar investments.2'
There can be little doubt that real interest rates did rise during
this period. The nominal interest rate on 10-year Treasury bonds remained
essentially unchanged, starting at 10.5 percent in December 1982, rising to
11.8 percent by December 1983 and then falling to 11.5 percent in December
1984, while the inflation rate as measured by the CNP deflator fell from
5.2 percent for 1982 to 3.6 percent for 1983 and 3.4 percent for 1984. The
Hoey measure of expected real pretax yields on 10-year Treasury bonds rose
21 In thisemphasis on expected future budget deficits as the cause of
the high real long-term interest rates and the strong dollar, we agree with
the analysis of Blanchard (1981), Branson et al. (1985), and the 1984
Economic ReDort of the President.
25from 3.9 percent in December 1982 to 5.3 percent in January 1984 and
7.5 percent in May 1984 before subsiding to 5.9 percent in December 1984.
The leading alternative explanation to the proposition that current
and future budget deficits were the cause of the rise in real interest
rates is the increased investment demand that resulted from the 1981
changes in tax rules. Although we believe that those tax changes did
increase investment demand (see Feldstein, 1987, and Feldstein and Jun,
1987), we do not believe that this increase in investment demand was nearly
as important as the sharp climb in the budget deficit. The increase in the
cyclically-adjusted deficit from 1.8 percent of cyclically-adjusted GNP in
1981 to 3.7 percent in 1983 and 4.6 percent in 1985 was substantially
bigger than the increase in fixed investment.
But this paper is not the place to resolve the controversy about the
relative importance of expected future budget deficits and investment
incentives as causes of the rise in real interest rates and the dollar.22
The important matter for current purposes is that these two fiscal changes
--thebudget deficit and the increased investment incentives --increased
the attractiveness of dollar investments and thereby raised the value of
the dollar. The stronger dollar in turn meant that the inflation rate was
lower than it otherwise would have been. The expansion of nominal GNF was
therefore divided in a more favorable way between inflation and real CNP.
22 Feldstein (198Gb) provides estimates of the impact of the expected
budget deficits and of changes in tax rules on the dollar-mark value and
concludes that the deficit effect is substantial but that the effect of the
tax incentives cannot be discerned in the data.
264. Conclusion
The evidence presented in this paper contradicts the popular view that
the 1983-84 economic recovery was the result of a consumer boom financed by
reductions in the personal income tax. We also find no support for the
proposition that the recovery reflected an increase in the supply of labor
induced by the reduction in personal marginal tax rates.
The timing of the expansion and the composition of the real output
changes make it clear that the primary cause of increased output was the
shift to a more expansionary monetary policy that occurred in 1982. In
particular, short term nominal interest rates fell throughout the period
while nominal CNP rose, indicating that the supply of money was increasing
faster than the demand for money. Formal tests of the impact of monetary
and fiscal policy imply that the increased budget deficits played no role
in the rise of nominal GNP. Any positive effect of the deficits on total
demand was presumably offset by the contractionary effects of higher
interest rates.
An important distinguishing feature of the 1983-84 recovery was the
unusually rapid increase of business investment while consumer spending and
Federal government purchases of goods and services were not unusually
strong. This pattern also points to the roles of monetary policy and the
enhanced investment incentives contained in the 1981 tax reform.
The expansion of total demand in 1983-84 was divided more favorably
between real output and inflation than would have been expected on the
basis of past experience. Our analysis shows that this important
difference can be explained by the sharp increase in the value of the
dollar during this period. Although the strong dollar depressed exports and
27induced a rise in imports, its net effect on total real output was
favorable because it reduced the rate of inflation and thereby permitted
more of the rise in nominal GNP to be channelled into increased real GNP.
The dollar's rise and the resulting fall in inflation also may have
induced the Federal Reserve to permit a more expansionary monetary policy
during this period than they otherwise would have. To that extent, our
analysis understates the impact of the strong dollar on the pace of real
expansion.
The dollar's sharp rise during this period occurred despite the easing
of monetary policy because of the expansionary fiscal polity. The increased
budget deficit and the enhanced incentives for business investment raised
real interest rates and thus made U.S. securities more attractive to
foreign and domestic portfolio investors. The result was an increased
value of the dollar.
The expansionary fiscal polity did contribute to the greater than
expected rise of real GNP in 1983-84, but it did so through an unusual
channel. The fiscal expansion raised output because it caused a favorable
supply shock and not because it was a traditional stimulus to demand. The
budget deficit and the investment incentives were expansionary in the
short-run because, by causing a rise of the dollar, they reduced inflation
and thus permitted a faster growth of real GNP.
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Tests of the Contribution of Fiscal Policy
to Explaining Nominal GNP Growth












(1)M2 No 1.30 0.25 2.16 0.24
(2)M2 Yes 1.42 0.24 1.24 0.37
(3)M2 Adj No 1.30 0.25 1.10 0.50
(4)M2 Adj Yes 1.42 0.24 0.95 0.48
The F-statistics based on the adjusted fiscal variables have 8 and 78
degrees of freedom for Test 1 and 8 and 4 degrees of freedom for Test 2;
the statistics based on the adjusted fiscal variables have 4 and 86 degrees













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Decomposition of Nominal CNP Changes


























1983:1 .016 .009 .008 119.4 .000 .009 .000 .003
1983:2 .031 .022 .008 123.0 .014 .009 .013 .009
1983:3 .022 .015 .009 128.7 .007 .008 .010 .005
1983:4 .029 .018 .011 130.2 .013 .004 .020 —.003
1984:1 .036 .025 .010 131.6 .018 .007 .026 —.000
1984:2 .021 .013 .007 132.8 .004 .009 .012 .001
1984:3 .014 .006 .008 141.7 —.002 .009 .005 .002
1984:4 .011 .004 .007 147.2 —.006 .011 .004 —.000
1985:1 .019 .012 .006 156.5 .000 .012 .010 .002
1985:2 .014 .006 .008 149.1 —.004 .010 .009 —.003
1985:3 .017 .010 .006 139.2 .000 .010 .009 .001
1985:4 .015 .007 .008 128.2 —.002 .009 .008 —.001
The exchange rate index is the Federal Reserve Boards multilateral trade-
weighted nominal value of the dollar. The standard errors of the forecast
residuals are .005 for single quarters in column 6 and .004 for single quarters
in column 8, .015 and .009 respectively for the full year 1983, and .026 and .012
for the full year. 1984.